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The issue
There was doubt whether the country’s tele-
communications market would be ready to ab-
sorb 3G technology because of the high cost
of infrastructure development, expensive 3G
handsets, and the popularity (and affordability)
of the 2G platform which has made text mes-
saging the cheapest means of communication
for the masses.
However, user demands for faster data trans-
mission and more sophisticated multimedia
services that include voice, video, and fax trans-
mission and reception that are impossible in
the current 2G platform seem to have made
the deployment of 3G technology inevitable.
Third generation technology allows wireless
applications that will enable roaming capabili-
ties, broad bandwidth, and high-speed com-
munications of as much as 2 megabits per sec-
ond. Under the 3G platform, the convergence
of existing cellular standards such as global
system for mobile communications (GSM),
code division multiple access (CDMA), and
time division multiple access (TDMA) into a
single uniform global system that includes ter-
restrial and satellite components in its func-
tioning is very likely.
The advent of 3G technology and the recent
issuance by the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) of 3G licenses to three tele-
communications companies through an ad-
ministrative procedure have brought into light
the crucial importance of revisiting the spec-
trum management policy. Some legislators have
questioned the appropriateness of the admin-
istrative allocation method used by NTC in
awarding those licenses. The suggestion was
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to consider other allocation methods such as
market-based mechanism like an auction.
Undoubtedly, 3G technology challenges the
regulator to have a more efficient allocation
and assignment of radio spectrum. As pointed
out by Hatfield (1993), radio-based systems are
crucial in extending telecommunications and
information services in the economy and an
administrative process used to manage a criti-
cal and scarce resource—the radio spectrum—
raises certain policy issues. Administrative pro-
cesses lack the flexibility to deal with forces
affecting frequency management, namely,
rapid technical and marketplace changes, the
resulting pressure for faster decisionmaking,
and the increased economic importance of
radio-based services, which in turn have led
countries to investigate, experiment with, and
implement alternative ways of managing the
spectrum resource.1
Spectrum management is traditionally viewed
as a system of radio frequency allocation, al-
lotment, and assignment. In this system, the
entire range of the useful spectrum is divided
into blocks or bands of frequencies called al-
locations. These frequency allocations deter-
mine the type of use allowed within the block
or band of frequencies. For example, separate
allocations are made for broadcasting, land mo-
bile radio, point-to-point microwave, and ama-
teur radio services. Broadly, allotment refers
to the subdivision of bands already allocated
to a particular service for specific user and/or
provider groups within that service. Within an
allocation for the land mobile radio service,
for example, allotments might be made for
public cellular mobile telephone, specialized
mobile radio (“closed user group”), and pub-
lic safety services. An assignment, on the other
hand, is a grant of authority—a license—for a
specific party to operate a radio transmitter on
a specific channel at a particular location un-
der a specific set of conditions (Hatfield 1993).
This brief Policy Notes first presents the policy
and institutional framework for spectrum man-
agement and then, discusses alternative ap-
proaches to spectrum management and their
policy implications.2
Policy and institutional framework
for spectrum management
Legal basis
Republic Act 7925 (An Act to Promote and
Govern the Development of Philippine Tele-
communications and the Delivery of Public
Telecommunications Services) states two basic
principles for spectrum allocation and assign-
ment, namely: (a) allocation should be given
to the best-qualified applicant, and (b) when
demand for specific frequencies exceed avail-
ability, an open tender bidding process shall
be used. The applicants are evaluated on the
basis of a predetermined set of criteria such as
possession of a legislative franchise, track
record, existing infrastructure, financial stabil-
ity, and the absence of outstanding financial
obligations to the NTC. The law requires a pe-
riodic review of spectrum allocation and as-
______________
1 Dale Hatfield. 1993. Spectrum issues for the 1990s:
new challenges for spectrum management. Conference on
National Spectrum Management Policies and Strategies
for the 1990s and Beyond. Centre for International Research
on Communication and Information Technologies, South
Melbourne, Australia, November 23.
2 I will discuss the regulation of the spectrum in another
Policy Notes because of space limitations.
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signment and the imposition of “reasonable
spectrum user fees” (section 15, RA 7925). The
NTC monitors the use of spectrum allocations
and reserves the right to recall and reallocate
unused channels.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
7925 provide the following guidelines on spec-
trum management:
z The radio spectrum allocation and assign-
ment shall be subject to review in the interest
of public service and in order to keep pace
with the development in wireless technology
with the end in view of insuring wider access
to the limited radio spectrum and the use of
cost effective technology.
z The Commission shall create a Radio Fre-
quency Consultative Committee from various
stakeholders from the telecommunications in-
dustry and the Department of Transportation
and Communication and the NTC, which shall
recommend to the Commission guidelines cov-
ering the following concerns:
– the procedure on how to undertake
the review and allocation of the radio
spectrum taking into consideration the
need to provide universal access to basic
telephone service.
– the transfer of all authorized and ex-
isting users in the band allocated to other
bands of radio frequencies.
– how the cost of the transfer of the
authorized and existing users to other fre-
quency bands shall be shared by the new
assignees.
– the manner of calculating the cost
of the transfer.
– the procedure on how to calculate
the reasonable spectrum users fees and
the amount to be paid for the use of the
spectrum.
– the determination of situations where
the demand for a particular radio fre-
quency band exceeds availability and the
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process for 3G allo-
cation illustrates the
process undertaken
by NTC in awarding




four out of nine appli-
cants were deter-
mined to be capable
of providing 3G ser-
vices. However, one
of the four was dis-
qualified because of an outstanding indebted-
ness to NTC.
Spectrum licensing and transfer of rights
The NTC awards licenses based on the spe-
cific service requested. It maintains a “tech-
nology-neutral” position with regard to licens-
ing, meaning, the company can use any cho-
sen technology. A license is valid for three years
and can be renewed for continued use. The
renewal process is less rigorous than the initial
assignment process. Spectrum rights may be
transferred to other parties but this requires
NTC approval. The transferee must be able to
meet NTC’s assignment criteria. As deemed
necessary, the NTC reserves the right to reallo-
cate existing spectrum assignments but a pub-
lic hearing is required prior to reallocation.
New assignees (entrants) should reach an agree-
ment with legacy licensees or “tenants” on the
channel with compensation at the expense of
the new entrant. The agreement may involve
carrying the tenant on the assignee’s network,PN 2006-11
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a buy-out of the current tenant or compensa-
tion for infrastructure investments made by the
tenant.
It is noted that the negotiations are left to the
private parties concerned but disputes may be
raised with the NTC for appropriate action. The
NTC has adopted a hands-off policy unless the
affected parties cannot settle their disagreement
among themselves.
Spectrum fees
NTC indicated that spectrum fees have been
an important source of revenue for the gov-
ernment, contributing about P500 million to
the national coffers in 2005. Under the tele-
communications law, “spectrum user fees shall
be applied uniformly and without discrimina-
tion to all users under the same classification
or category. Services which cater to emergency
situations as may be determined by govern-
ment, national disasters, public safety, and na-
tional security shall be exempt from the pay-
ment of spectrum user fees.” A committee ap-
pointed by the NTC makes recommendations
on the fee schedule. Before approving the fi-
nal schedule of spectrum user fees, the NTC
conducts public hearings.
According to the NTC, there are three criteria
which are considered when determining fees:
1) “sale-ability” of the frequency, 2) bandwidth
requirements, and 3) geographic consider-
ations—fees are decreased for service delivery
in rural areas to attract companies to
underserved markets.
In the recent allocation for 3G-radio band-
width, spectrum fees were tied to the number
of subscribers. A base price of $1.2M (for 10
MHz) was established to accommodate up to
four million users. An additional spectrum user
fee of $26,000 will be assessed for each addi-
tional group of 100,000 users over the four
million-user threshold. In 2000, the NTC tried
to improve spectrum assignment efficiency by
imposing fees according to bandwidth require-
ments. Fees were previously levied according
to the number of mobile stations maintained
by the licensee. Telecom firms have the option
to use and pay for a wider bandwidth in order
to reduce the need to build and install new
stations. If the bandwidth were thin, telecoms
firms would have to invest in more stations to
widen coverage for a particular service.
Toward an efficient spectrum
allocation and assignment
Spectrum scarcity drives the need for efficient
spectrum allocation and assignment. Spectrum
is used in broadcast radio and television, mi-
crowave telecommunications system, satellites,
dispatches, and wireless communication sys-
tems, among others. Although the spectrum is
an inexhaustible resource that anyone with ap-
propriate technologies and equipments could
use, scarcity in spectrum arises because of the
possibility of interference, i.e., not everyone
can transmit and use the same spectrum bands
all at the same time and different signals may
interfere with each other causing the failure of
receivers to differentiate and translate the
sound into intelligible information.
The National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration (NTIA) of the United
States explains the problem of scarcity as fol-
Spectrum scarcity drives the need for efficient
spectrum allocation and assignment. Spectrum is
used in broadcast radio and television, microwave
telecommunications system, satellites, dispatches,
and wireless communication systems, among others.
Although the spectrum is an inexhaustible resource
that anyone with appropriate technologies and
equipments could use, scarcity in spectrum arises
because of the possibility of interference...PN 2006-11
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lows: “Electromagnetic waves propagate out-
ward in all directions. A transmitter generally
seeks to communicate with a particular re-
ceiver; the transmitting antenna directs the ma-
jority of the signal toward that receiver and
the receiving antenna is most sensitive to sig-
nals coming from the direction of the trans-
mitter. However, an antenna radiates signals
at lower levels and can receive signals from all
directions. An interfering signal will be ampli-
fied and detected just like the desired signal
once it enters the receiver. If the interfering sig-
nal is sufficiently large, it can prevent the de-
sired signal from being properly demodulated
and understood.” The NTIA points out that the
use of the radio spectrum is regulated, access
is controlled, and rules for its use enforced be-
cause of the possibilities of interference among
uncoordinated uses. Thus, some form of coor-
dination of operating frequencies and trans-
mitting powers is necessary and this motivates
the search for appropriate allocation and regu-
lation of the spectrum.
Two ways of allocating spectrum
There are two general ways of allocating spec-
trum: administrative allocation and market-
based allocation.
Under administrative allocation,3 the govern-
ment grants licenses to firms that best show fi-
nancial and technical capacity to provide the
required capitalization and infrastructure that
would, theoretically, optimize usage of the
awarded spectrum bands. These license hold-
ers operate under rules and regulations set by
the government, which includes assigning spec-
trum blocks according to specific criteria and
determining which services would be permit-
ted to operate at a particular frequency. A gen-
eral procedure for this system begins when a
firm wishing to utilize spectrum for a specific
purpose within a particular frequency in a par-
ticular location applies for a license that cov-
ers only that purpose, frequency, and location.
However, this system has produced inefficien-
cies and underutilization of spectrum band-
widths, not to mention limiting the flexibility
in service provision and impeding technologi-
cal developments. This has also been criticized
as a process that could be politically influ-
enced.4 The inefficiency and inflexibility of the
system has resulted to unused spectrum units
that are merely warehoused by license hold-
ers.
A more efficient mode of allocating scarce re-
sources is through market forces. An adminis-
trative procedure for allocating and assigning
a scarce resource such as spectrum is ineffi-
cient. The literature indicates that establishing
a market for spectrum, in which owners could
buy, sell, subdivide, and aggregate spectrum
parcels would lead to a much more efficient
allocation of this scarce resource.5 Scarcity
makes the spectrum an economic good that is
best allocated by market mechanisms. Benkler
suggests defining property rights in spectrum
units and allowing market transactions to allo-
cate spectrum to its highest valued uses as de-
fined by the willingness of spectrum users to
pay for the spectrum units.6
A market-based allocation and assignment of
spectrum would primarily rely on market pric-
ing to allocate and assign spectrum units to
those who value them the most. It will also
allow for flexibility of use that can accommo-
date changes in technological preferences. The
main elements of an ideal market regime, as
______________
3 Sometimes referred to as administrative fiat or beauty contests.
4 Faulhaber and Faber (2002) cited the U.S. case of radio licenses obtained by
Lyndon Johnson while he was still a congressman. The authors contend that
these controversial licenses became the foundation of his personal fortune.
5  Faulhaber, Gerald R. and David Farber. 2002. Spectrum management: prop-
erty rights, markets and the commons [online]. Available from the World Wide
Web: (http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/Acrobat/Faulhaber _AEW_paper_6_19_02.
pdf).
6 Benkler, Yochai. 1997. Overcoming agoraphobia: building the commons of
the digitally networked environment. 11 Harvard Journal of Law and Technol-
ogy 287 (Winter).PN 2006-11
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reflected in recent literature and outlined by
Kwerel and Williams, are: (a) flexibility of use
wherein no restrictions on spectrum use and
users beyond those necessary to limit interfer-
ence, prevent anti-competitive concentration,
and comply with international agreements are
imposed; (b) exhaustive assignment of spectrum
rights, i.e., no spectrum should be reserved;
and (c) exclusive licenses to internalize trans-
action costs, which do not preclude the use of
intensive engineering techniques that permit
economically efficient sharing of spectrum by
multiple users.
All these will provide correct incentives for li-
cense holders to maximize the value of their
spectrum; to replace current boundary limits
to output limits defined in terms of power lim-
its and not by technical restrictions regarding
power and place of emission and direction and
time of emission; and special provisions for
low-power devices such as cordless tele-
phones, automatic garage doors, etc.7 These
elements of the market regime make the ‘own-
ers’ of the spectrum particularly open to tech-
nical innovations and sensitive to changes in
consumer preferences which would contrib-
ute to higher consumer welfare and more prof-
its to owners of the spectrum.
Models under market-based allocation
method
Under the market-based allocation method,
two schools of thought have emerged – (a) the
property system, and (b) the spectrum com-
mons. While both property system and the
spectrum commons are market-based alterna-
tives to the administrative allocation system,
their difference lies in that the property system
is a market in infrastructure rights while the
spectrum commons is a market in equipments.
Property systems will invest more at the core
of the network and have cheaper end user
equipment while spectrum commons will have
exactly the opposite capital investment struc-
ture. The end user equipment market is the pri-
mary market driving innovation and efficiency
in the spectrum commons model.
The most important transaction costs associ-
ated with the commons model are the network
management overhead that devices need to use
in order to coordinate their communications.
Primary administrative costs for the property
system are the definition and judicial enforce-
ment of the property rights. On the other hand,
the most important transaction costs associated
with spectrum commons are those entailed by
the need to negotiate clearance of permissions
to transmit in a specified bandwidth. In spec-
trum commons, the primary administrative
costs are the standards setting processes and
the enforcement of equipment compliance with
them.8
There is substantial agreement among the ad-
vocates of a property-based system that auc-
tion is the best mechanism for spectrum to be
priced according to how potential users value
them. The primary advantage of an auction is
its ability to assign the spectrum to those best
able to use it. This is accomplished by compe-
tition among license applicants. Those com-
panies giving the highest value for the spec-
trum are willing to bid higher than the others
and hence, tend to win the licenses.
A second important advantage of auctions is
that the competition is not wasteful and leads
to auction revenues. The U.S. Treasury real-
ized over US$40 billion in revenues in 1994-
2001 from 33 spectrum auctions. The early
auctions in Europe for 3G mobile wireless li-
censes raised nearly $100 billion in revenues.
______________
7 Kwerel, Evan and John Williams. 2002. A proposal for a rapid transition to
market allocation of spectrum. Working Paper 38. Federal Communications
Commission, Washington, D.C.
8 Benkler, Yochai. 2002. Some economics of wireless communications. Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology 16, No. 1 (Fall).PN 2006-11
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Finally, an auction is a transparent means of
assigning licenses as all parties can see who
won the auction and why.9
Engineers tend to favor the spectrum commons
where they believe future innovations and
technological breakthroughs can be possible.
Benkler (2002) likens the commons model to
the “open road” or the “open architecture” of
the internet, which describes a network that
treats some resources as open to all equipment
to use, leaving it to the equipment manufac-
turers—cars or computers, respectively, in
those open networks—to optimize the func-
tionality they provide using that resource.
The spectrum commons model is likely to have
higher capacity for any given level of invest-
ment in equipment and to grow capacity more
rapidly than property-based systems because
the free availability of bandwidth and the higher
computational intensity of end user equipment
will allow spectrum commons systems to use
and improve processing and cooperation gain
in pace with the price/power growth in pro-
cessing. On the other hand, property-based sys-
tems will be limited by the lower computa-
tional complexity of end user devices, the rela-
tive stickiness of proprietary bandwidth, and
the likely higher signal-to-noise ratio required
by receivers.
It seems that these two systems are not incom-
patible. Faulhaber and Farber (2002) believe
that the spectrum commons model can exist
within a property regime, particularly in a prop-
erty regime with an easement for noninterfering
uses. It is noted that there still seems to be a
lack of sufficient empirical evidence to show
which of the two systems is the most efficient
spectrum allocation system. Faulhaber and
Farber suggest that the most prudent course
would be to start the transition away from the
administration allocation system by setting up
sufficiently robust experiments with both mar-
ket-based approaches. This way, something can
be learned from the experiences and at the
same time, the approach will not preempt fu-
ture policymaking.
Relevance for the Philippines
Unlike other Asian countries such as Hongkong
and Singapore that have shifted to a market-
based mechanism through auctions, the Phil-
ippines still uses an administrative allocation
and assignment approach or a `beauty con-
test’ system in allocating spectrum rights. This
was used in the recent award of 3G licenses.
The Philippines is not alone though in using
this method since some countries like Malay-
sia and Thailand and European countries such
as Spain and Denmark also use it. However, it
will be important for the NTC to examine very
thoroughly the merits and demerits of alterna-
tive allocation/assignment methods in order to
determine which is most suitable for the Phil-
ippines given the policy and institutional en-
vironment and the state of the information and
telecommunications market.
A shift to a market-based system is not easy. It
would involve a redefinition and restructuring
of rights across a wide range of spectrum. Ex-
periences of regulatory bodies in other coun-
tries such as that of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) in the United States
with regard to making the transition from ad-
ministrative to market-oriented allocation
show the complexity of the shift. The shift to a
market-based mechanism requires transpar-
ency of the process, a highly liquid spectrum
market (such that large portions of spectrum
are technically and legally substitutable and
no single entity can affect the prices), partici-
pation by all players, and simultaneity of the
______________
9 Cramton, Peter. 2001. Spectrum auctions. In Handbook of
telecommunications economics edited by Martin Cave,




process (such that all highly complementary
and substitutable spectrum should be available
to the market at the same time).10
Policy implications
If the government looks to the ICT industry as
one of the main drivers of economic growth,
it has to start on the difficult task of reviewing
its spectrum management policy to arrive at a
better allocation and assignment of spectrum
rights.
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There are both competing uses and users of
scarce radio spectrum. Reexamining the
country’s spectrum management policy will
involve, among others, a review of the alloca-
tion and assignment of current radio spectrum
bands, a determination of the optimal alloca-
tion and assignment method, and a realloca-
tion of the spectrum to its most efficient allo-
cation and assignment, to the extent that is
practicable and possible. The underlying ob-
jective of the review is public interest.
A corollary is the review of licensing policies
as well as the structure of fees charged to spec-
trum users in view of the huge revenue poten-
tial. In mid-2005, NTC called for the realloca-
tion of several identified bands and the recall
of idle frequencies from radio and television
stations. Some incumbents, not surprisingly,
questioned this decision, claiming disruption
in their provision of services as well as creat-
ing risks for sunk investments in the telecom-
munications sector. They also cited the finan-
cial and technical inability of potential new
entrants to roll out 3G services as a reason for
maintaining the status quo.
The regulator has to review its licensing poli-
cies and the structure of fees charged in light
of the current developments in the informa-
tion and telecommunications market. 
If the government looks to the ICT industry as one of
the main drivers of economic growth, it has to start
on the difficult task of reviewing its spectrum
management policy...Reexamining the country’s
spectrum management policy will involve, among
others, a review of the allocation and assignment of
current radio spectrum bands, a determination of the
optimal allocation and assignment method, and a
reallocation of the spectrum to its most efficient
allocation and assignment...
______________
10 Kwerel, Evan and John Williams. 2002. A proposal for a
rapid transition to market allocation of spectrum. Working
Paper 38, Federal Communications Commission, Washing-
ton, D.C.